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Abstract
The literature on audit strategies has focused on random audits or on audits condi-
tioned only on income declaration. In contrast, tax authorities employ the tools of
predictive analytics to identify taxpayers for audit, with a range of variables used for
conditioning. The paper explores the compliance and revenue consequences of the
use of predictive analytics in an agent-based model that draws upon a behavioral ap-
proach to tax compliance. The taxpayers in the model form subjective beliefs about
the probability of audit from social interaction, and are guided by a social custom that
is developed from meeting other taxpayers. The belief and social custom feed into
the occupational choice between employment and two forms of self-employment. It is
shown that the use of predictive analytics yields a signicant increase in revenue over
a random audit strategy.
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1 Introduction
The standard analysis of tax compliance in Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki
(1974), and much of the literature that has followed, is based on the assumption that tax-
payers abide by the axioms of expected utility theory and that audits are random. An
exception is the literature on optimal auditing  including Reinganum and Wilde (1985,
1986) and Chander and Wilde (1998) which characterizes the equilibrium audit strategy as
a function of reported income. In practice, the overwhelming majority of audits performed
by tax authorities are risk-based (in which taxpayers are targeted for audit), with only
a small fraction of audits performed on a random basis for statistical purposes. Unlike the
presumption of the optimal auditing literature, however, the targeting of risk-based audits
is not based solely on the income report. Rather, tax authorities rely on the experience of
case o¢ cers reviewing returns and, increasingly, on the basis of predictive analytics which
applies statistical tools to the data on a set of taxpayerscharacteristics, often in the form
of qualitative variables (see Cleary, 2011; Hsu et al., 2015). The expected utility model
has also been subject to signicant criticism and many alternatives models with behavioral
foundations have been proposed.
The paper explores the compliance and revenue consequences of the use of predictive
analytics in an agent-based model that draws upon a behavioral approach to tax compliance.
We use agent-based modelling because this allows us to explore a richer model than is
possible in a theoretical analysis but means we rely on simulation to generate our results.
The model is constructed on the foundation of a social network that governs the interaction
between taxpayers and the transmission of information between taxpayers. The information
consists of attitudes towards compliance (in the form of a social custom) and beliefs about
audits (a subjective probability of being audited). Taxpayers must make an occupational
choice between employment and two forms of self-employment. Employment provides a safe
income but because of the third-party reporting of income there is no possibility of non-
compliance. The two self-employment occupations are risky, but non-compliance is possible.
Risk averse taxpayers allocate into the occupations so as to maximize expected utility given
the expected income and riskiness of each occupation. Given the di¤erent levels of risk in the
occupations, taxpayers divide among occupations on the basis of risk aversion. This results
in self-selection of those who will exploit opportunities for non-compliance into occupations
where such opportunities arise.
The predictive analytics investigated in the model are based on Tobit and logit regression
models using data from tax returns and from the outcomes of past audits. The Tobit
model targets audits on the basis of predicted evasion level and the logit model on the
basis of predicted likelihood of non-compliance. The predictive analytics are implemented
by simulating the model with random audits for an initial period to acquire audit data, and
then using this data to target audits where non-compliance is predicted. It is shown that
predictive analytics secure a signicant increase in revenue over a random audit strategy.
To give the results validity it is necessary to build the agent-based model on a sound
underlying theory of the compliance decision. Our modelling starts from the assumption
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that taxpayers do not know the audit strategy of the tax authority but must form a be-
lief about the probability of being audited. This is consistent with the idea of behavioral
economics that individuals generally do not evaluate risky prospects using the objective
probabilities of events but form subjective probabilities (or transform objective probabilities
using a weighting function). The subjective probabilities (or, in our terminology, beliefs) can
di¤er signicantly, and persistently, from the objective probability (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). There is also empirical (Spicer and Lundstedt, 1976) and experimental (Baldry, 1986)
evidence that the individual compliance decision also takes into account social factors such
as the perceived extent of evasion in the population. We choose to summarize the range of
social factors as the attitude of the taxpayer toward compliance. This is essentially identical
to the concept of tax morale that is prominent in the empirical literature (e.g., Torgler,
2002).
A key feature of our modelling is to make explicit the processes through which the
attitude towards compliance and the belief about auditing are formed. Attitudes and beliefs
are endogenous and result from the interaction of a taxpayer with other taxpayers and
with the tax authority. The importance of interaction makes it necessary to specify the
social environment in which the interaction takes place. We do this by employing a social
network with a given set of links between taxpayers to govern the ow of information.
After each round of audits some of the taxpayers who are linked will meet and exchange
information. The likelihood of information transmission is greater between taxpayers in the
same occupation.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the separate concepts that are built
into the model. Section 3 provides analytical details on how these concepts are implemented.
Sections 4 and 5 describe the simulation results under a random audit rule and when the
audit rule is informed by predictive analytics. Section 6 concludes.
2 Conceptual Approach
This section describes the elements that constitute the agent-based model. The purpose
of the discussion is to relate these elements to the extensive literature on the individual
tax compliance decision. The seminal analyses of the compliance decision by Allingham
and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974) were built upon the application of expected utility
theory. A standard criticism of this model is that it over-predicts the extent of evasion when
evaluated using the objective probability of audit which has motivated the application of
ideas from behavioral economics.1 The behavioral models of the compliance decision are
surveyed in Hashimzade et al. (2013).
The key elements of our agent-based model is that taxpayers make an occupational choice
decision prior to the compliance decision. The compliance decision is based on the attitude
toward compliance as summarized in a social custom and belief about audits captured in a
subjective probability of being audited. The information used to form attitudes and beliefs
1It should be noted that Slemrod (2007) gives good reasons why this claim should be treated with caution.
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is transmitted through meetings between taxpayers governed by a social network. Each of
these components is now described in greater detail.
2.1 Occupational choice
Occupational choice determines the possibility for engaging in tax evasion. Income from
employment is often subject to a withholding tax and/or third-party reporting to the tax
authority. For example, the UK Pay-As-You-Earn system involves income tax being de-
ducted by employers and remitted directly to the tax authority. This prevents evasion by
employees (unless there is collusion with the employer) and so non-compliance is only possible
for taxpayers who are self-employed. Occupations also di¤er in their traditions concerning
payment in cash. Those in which cash payment is common provide the greater opportunity
for evasion. Occupational choice has not had a prominent role in the literature on tax eva-
sion despite its clear importance. Exceptions to this are Pestieau and Possen (1981) who
model occupational choice, Cowell (1981), Isachsen and Strøm (1980), and Trandel and Snow
(1999) who analyze the choice between working in the regular and the informal economy.
Occupational choice is also important for the connection it has with risk aversion. Individ-
uals allocate to occupations on the basis of their ability at that occupation and their attitude
to risk. Those who are least risk averse will choose to enter the riskiest occupations. Kanbur
(1979) and Black and de Meza (1997) assume employment is safe but self-employment is
risky, and address the social e¢ ciency of aggregate risk-taking. Self-employment attracts
the least risk-averse taxpayers, who will evade the most when the opportunity arises. Hence,
occupational choice has the e¤ect of self-selecting taxpayers who will evade into a situation
in which they can evade. This observation should form part of any explanation of why
non-compliance can be so signicant within specic occupational groups.
Our model includes a choice between employment and two forms of self-employment.
Employment is a safe activity that delivers a certain income. Self-employment is risky
so that each taxpayer only knows the probability distribution of income when making an
occupational choice. One of the self-employment occupations is riskier than the other, in a
sense we make precise below.2
2.2 Social customs
The experiments of Baldry (1986) provide compelling evidence that the evasion decision is
not just a simple gamble. This can be rationalized by introducing an additional cost into
the evasion decision. These costs can be nancial (Bayer, 2006; Chetty, 2009; Lee, 2001)
or psychic (Gordon, 1989). Psychic costs can arise from fear of detection or concern about
the shame of being exposed. The magnitude of the psychic cost can reect an individuals
attitude towards compliance. Attitudes are an important feature of psychological theories
of tax compliance (Kirchler et al., 2008; Weigel et al., 1987). The psychic cost can also be
2Individuals di¤er in their level of skill in the occupations, and skills are one of the determinants of
income. This makes it necessary to state the formal details before riskiercan be explained in full.
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interpreted as the loss of the payo¤ from following a social norm for honest tax payment.
Adopting this interpretation makes it natural to assume that the size of the loss in payo¤
is generated by explicit social interaction, and that the size is larger when fewer taxpayers
evade (Fortin et al., 2007; Kim, 2003; Myles and Naylor, 1996; Traxler, 2010).
The additional costs have an important role in explaining some features of the tax evasion
decision. We model attitudes by including a social custom of honest tax payment in the model
so that there is a utility gain (relative to the state with non-compliance) when tax is paid in
full. The importance attached to the social custom by each taxpayer is determined by their
interaction with other taxpayers within the social network.
2.3 Subjective beliefs
We have already observed that if choice is based on objective probability of being audited
then the standard model over-predicts the amount of evasion. This has led to the application
of choice models based on non-expected utility theories. Non-expected utility models can
predict the correct level of evasion for reasonable parameter values. This is because they
permit the subjective probability of audit (the weighting on the payo¤ when audited) to be
greater than the objective probability. They also open the possibility of designing compliance
policy to manipulate the subjective nature of the decision (El¤ers and Hessing, 1997).
It is standard to distinguish between a choice with risk (the agent knows the probability
distribution of future events) and a choice with uncertainty (the agent does not know the
probabilities). A rst step away from expected utility theory is to consider a choice with risk
but to assume the probabilities are distorted into decisions weightsthat enter the expected
payo¤. Rank-dependent expected utility (Quiggin, 1981, 1982; Quiggin and Wakker, 1994)
uses a particular weighting scheme to transform the objective probability of events into sub-
jective probabilities and has been applied to the evasion decision by Arcand and Graziosi
(2005), Bernasconi (1998) and Eide (2001). Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) also uses a weighting scheme but payo¤s are determined by
gains and losses relative to a reference point. It has been applied to compliance by al-Nowaihi
and Dhami (2007), Bernasconi and Zanardi (2004), Rablen (2010), and Yaniv (1999). Un-
certainty has been modelled by assuming the agent forms a probability distribution over the
possible probability distributions of outcomes (second-order uncertainty). This gives rise
to the concept of ambiguity, surveyed in Camerer and Weber (1992) which has been applied
to tax compliance by Snow and Warren (2005).
We incorporate these ideas into the model by assuming that each taxpayer forms a sub-
jective belief about the audit probability and by explicitly modelling the process for forming
beliefs. This allows the model to provide an explanation of how subjective probabilities can
endogenously emerge and remain systematically di¤erent from the objective probabilities.
4
2.4 Social network
The illegality of tax evasion and the incentive the tax authority has to conceal its audit
strategy imply that taxpayers cannot be fully informed. A natural assumption is that infor-
mation will not be revealed publicly, but will be transmitted between taxpayers in a position
of mutual trust. The social network we adopt is a formalization of this assumption.
The importance of social contacts is supported by empirical evidence on the positive
connection between the number of tax evaders a taxpayer knows and the extent of evasion of
that taxpayer (De Juan et al., 1994; Geeroms andWilmots, 1985; Spicer and Lundstedt, 1976;
Wallschutzky, 1984; Webley et al., 1988). This evidence demonstrates that the compliance
decision is not made in isolation but that each taxpayer makes reference to the observed
behavior of the society in which they operate.
We capture this social interaction by applying network theory (Goyal, 2009; Jackson,
2004). Networks have previously been used in the analysis of evasion by Korobow et al.
(2007) and Franklin (2009). They have also been applied to crime more generally (Glaeser
et al., 1996).
The social network in our model plays two roles. First, it transmits the social custom
from one person to another: if two non-evaders meet the importance of the social custom of
honest payment is increased for both, but if a non-evader meets an evader then it is reduced
for the non-evader and increased for the evader. Second, the network transmits information
about audit policy. Since the audit strategy is not public information, taxpayers have to
infer it from their own experience and from the receipt of information about the experiences
of others. Our simulations are an application of agent-based modelling (Bloomquist, 2004;
Tesfatsion, 2006) with agent interaction controlled by the social network.
3 Network Model
In this section we model the formation of attitudes and beliefs as the outcome of social
interaction, and opportunities as the outcome of occupational choice. This is achieved by
applying the theory of network formation to track the links between taxpayers and the
transmission of attitudes and beliefs, and combining this with agent-based modelling which
employs a behavioral approach to describe individual choices.
There are N individuals, indexed by j = 1; :::; N , whose lives extend throughout the
simulation. Although the lives are long, each individual makes a succession of single-period
decisions and so is myopic. We discuss possible relaxation of this assumption in Section
6. Individuals interact repeatedly in discrete time, t = 0; :::; T , where each period t is
understood to be the tax return period. Each individual, j, at time t is described by a
vector of characteristics  
wj; j; s
1
j ; s
2
j ; zj; p
1
j;t; p
2
j;t; j;t

: (1)
At the start of a simulation the values for all characteristics are randomly assigned to each
taxpayer by making draws from independent distributions. Once drawn, the rst ve char-
acteristics in (1) remain constant throughout the simulation and so represent the exogenous
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parameters describing the agents. These characteristics are wj, the wage in employment
(occupation 0); j, the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion; s

j , the skill in self-employed occu-
pation ,  = 1; 2; and zj, the payo¤ from following the social custom. To avoid the potential
for misleading results that might follow from an unusual draw of these characteristics our
results are calculated as the average of multiple independent simulations. In particular, we
simulate ve times to obtain the baseline results in Section 4 and ten times for the analysis
in Section 5.
The remaining three characteristics in (1) are endogenous and so are updated period-
by-period through interaction with the tax authority and with other taxpayers in the social
network. These characteristics are additionally indexed by time, t. These are: pj;t 2 [0; 1],
the perceived (subjective) probability of audit in occupation ,  = 1; 2, and j;t 2 [0; 1],
the weight attached to the payo¤ from following the social custom for honesty.
We now describe how these characteristics enter into the choice problem of a taxpayer
and how the subjective probability and weight given to social custom are updated.
In each period, t, every individual chooses their preferred occupation and, once income
is realized, the optimal level of evasion. Individual j has a choice between employment or
entering one of two self-employment occupations. These are occupations 1 and 2, which
we denote by SE1 and SE2.3 If employment is chosen the wage, wj, is obtained with cer-
tainty, whereas in self-employment earnings are random. The outcome of self-employment
for individual j in occupation  at time t is given by sj y

j;t, where s

j is drawn once at the
beginning of the simulation, but yj;t is drawn randomly at every time t from the probability
distribution function F ().4 The choice of occupation is taken on the basis of F () but
the choice of evasion is made after the realization of yj;t. It is assumed that E (y
1) < E (y2)
and V ar (y1) < V ar (y2), so if s1j = s
2
j SE2 is riskier than SE1 but o¤ers a higher expected
income. Both self-employment occupations are riskier than employment, in the sense that
for each agent the wage in employment is certain, i.e., V ar (wj) = 0.
It is not possible to evade tax in employment because income is subject to third-party
reporting or to a withholding tax. Evasion only becomes possible when self-employment is
chosen. In occupation  taxpayer j has belief at time t that the probability of being audited
and evasion being detected5 is pj;t. The belief about the audit probability is updated through
the experience of the taxpayer with audits and through the exchange of information when
meeting other taxpayers. The attitude of taxpayer j toward evasion is summarized in j;t,
the weight given to the social custom. This attitude is also updated through meetings with
other taxpayers. We describe the processes for updating attitudes and beliefs in detail after
3It may seem unrealistic to have an occupational choice in every period but in the simulations only a very
small proportion of taxpayers actually change occupation in any period.
4For tractability, we abstract in this setting from the possibility of bankruptcy for agents in the self-
employment occupations. Were this feature allowed for (see, for example, Bloomquist, 2011), business
survival would become a function of the outcome of the tax evasion gamble, which generates a dynamic
e¤ect on compliance in addition to those we study in our model. We are grateful to an anonymous referee
for this point.
5Here we assume that detection is full. Alternatively, one can assume partial detection, which gives rise
to a number of interesting issues which are beyond the scope of this paper.
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discussing the choice of occupation for given attitudes and beliefs.
The choice of occupation and the choice to evade tax involve risk. Taxpayer j has a
(constant) degree of relative risk aversion measured by the risk aversion parameter, j. The
taxpayer chooses occupation and evasion level at time t to maximize subjective expected
utility given beliefs fpj;tg. For analytical tractability, we assume throughout a CRRA form
for utility:
Uj (Y ) =
Y 1 j   1
1  j
: (2)
The attitude toward evasion determines the utility value of following the social custom of
honest tax payment. The payo¤ from the social custom is given by zj and the individual
weight, or the importance, assigned to this payo¤ by the taxpayer is determined by j;t.
Hence, compliance with tax payment at time t generates an additional utility from following
the social custom of j;tzj.
In employment there is no opportunity for evasion, and so the taxpayer obtains a payo¤
given by
V 0 =
[(1  )wj]1 j   1
1  j
+ j;tzj;
where  is the constant marginal tax rate. The possibility of tax evasion makes the choice of
self-employment a compound lottery: the income is random, as is the outcome of choosing
to evade.
Dene the expected payo¤ from the optimal choice of evasion in self-employment occu-
pation  for a given realization yj;t as
V e
 
yj;t

= max
E2[0;sj yj;t]

pj;tUj
 
[1   ] sj yj;t   fE

+(1  pj;t)Uj
 
[1   ] sj yj;t + E

+ j;tzj1[E=0]
	
;
where f > 1 is the ne levied on unpaid tax if evasion is detected. The term 1[A] is an
indicator function that takes the value of one if A is true and zero otherwise: the payo¤ from
the social custom is obtained only if tax is paid in full. The level of evasion, Ej;t = E
 
yj;t

,
will be a function of the realized income yj;t in occupation . The expected payo¤ from the
compound lottery describing occupation  is then
V  =
Z
V e (y) dF
 (y) :
The choice of occupation is made by comparing the (expected) utility levels from employment
and from self-employment. Hence, the chosen occupation is given by selecting the maximum
of fV 0; V 1; V 2g.
After self-employment occupation  is chosen at time t an outcome ~yj;t is realized accord-
ing to the probability distribution function F (). Given the outcome, the optimal evasion
decision is implemented, as described above. Denote the level of evasion that is realized by
~Ej;t = E
 
~yj;t

. Tax returns are submitted, and a proportion of those in self-employment
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occupations are then audited, according to a rule chosen by the tax authority. If evasion is
discovered, unpaid tax is reclaimed and the nes on unpaid tax are paid.
The social network is modelled as a set of bidirectional links described by an N  N
symmetric matrix of zeros and ones. For example, in the network described by matrix A
A =
2664
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0
3775 :
the rst row, representing the links of individual 1, has a single 1 in column 2 which means
that 1 is linked to 2. There is a corresponding 1 in the rst column in the second row
representing the link of individual 2 with 1. That is, the element in row i and column j of
matrix A is dened as
Aij =

1 if i and j are linked in the network,
0 otherwise.
We use a random (ErdösRényi) network, where agents i and j are linked with a common
exogenous probability, Pr [Aij = 1] = ; the matrix is created at the outset and does not
change.6 The network determines who may meet whom to exchange information. In each
period a random selection of meetings occur described by a matrix Ct of zeros and ones
randomly drawn in every period. Individuals i and j meet during period t if AijCtij = 1; at
a meeting they may or may not exchange information about their subjective probability of
audit in each self-employed occupation and about whether each of them was compliant in
that period. The probability of information exchange depends on the occupational groups
to which i and j belong; the probability is highest when they are in the same occupation.
Recall that individuals in all three occupations hold beliefs about the probability of
being audited in each of the two self-employment occupations; they also know that evasion
is not possible in employment. We assume there are two ways in which beliefs are updated.
Consider taxpayer j who has worked in occupation  2 f0; 1; 2g in period t. If j is self-
employed, after submission of the tax return this taxpayer may or may not be audited.
On the basis of the outcome js belief about the audit probability, pj;t, in that occupation
is then adjusted. The beliefs about the audit probability in the other self-employment
occupation, pj;t;  6= , remain unchanged at this stage. Following this, the taxpayer may
meet with a contact in the network. Let the meeting be with a taxpayer i who is engaged in
occupation  2 f0; 1; 2g. At the meeting information is exchanged with probability q. This
information is then used to update the belief about the audit probabilities, pj(i);t,  = f1; 2g,
in both self-employment occupations. If taxpayer j is in paid employment then his or her
6Here the network is xed, but the probabilities of information exchange between the linked individuals
change if they switch occupations, as we shall describe. Another possibility would be to have the network
itself revised as a consequence of chosen actions, i.e. agents in di¤erent occupations belonging to di¤erent
social networks. The model may also be analysed under, for instance, the small-world or power law networks
as alternatives to the random network (see, e.g., Andrei et al., 2014; Axtell et al., 2006; Souma et al., 2003.)
8
belief about audit probabilities in self-employment, pj;t  = f1; 2g, can only be updated at
the meeting.
The choice of occupation in period t + 1 is made on the basis of the beliefs

p1j;t; p
2
j;t
	
updated after the audits and the information exchange. Two di¤erent processes for the
updating of subjective beliefs following an audit have been proposed in the literature. As
studies have reliably demonstrated important deviations from Bayesian inference (see, for
example, Grether, 1980), we allow for non-Bayesian updating. The rst process, which is
qualitatively similar to a Bayesian process, is to assume that individuals feel marked as
targets if they are audited, so that one audit is believed likely to be followed by another. We
term this the target e¤ect. In contrast, those not audited in one period believe they are less
likely to be audited in the next period. Formally, if taxpayer j in occupation  2 f1; 2g is
audited in period t, his or her belief about being audited in the same occupation in the next
period is raised to probability P , otherwise it decays. The updating rule for the subjective
probability is therefore
~pj;t+1 =

P 2 [0; 1] if audited at t;
pj;t+1; d 2 [0; 1] otherwise. (3)
We refer to the case of P = 1 as the maximal target e¤ect. The alternative is the bomb-crater
e¤ect that is documented experimentally by Guala and Mittone (2005), Kastlunger et al.
(2009), Maciejovsky et al. (2007), and Mittone (2006). In this process a taxpayer who has
been audited in one period believes that they are less likely to be audited in the next, but
the belief gradually rises over time. The process is therefore described by
~pj;t+1 =

P 2 [0; 1] if audited at t;
pj;t + 
 
1  pj;t+1

;  2 [0; 1] otherwise, (4)
with P = 0 being the maximal bomb-crater e¤ect.
Recent empirical analysis using administrative data for the entire population of UK
taxpayers who submit tax returns has produced results that are in agreement with the
target e¤ect. Advani et al. (2015) report that compliance increases post-audit and remains
high for several periods before beginning to decrease again. This matches the target e¤ect
but is the opposite of what the bomb-crater e¤ect predicts. Since the empirical results are
based on analysis of actual behavior of the entire population of self-reporting taxpayers they
are very convincing, and so we adopt the target e¤ect in the simulations that follow.7
After the audit process is completed a taxpayer may meet with a contact in their social
network. The information that may (or may not) be exchanged at a meeting includes the
subjective probabilities and whether or not the agents were audited. If taxpayer j meets
taxpayer i and if the information exchange takes place, js subjective probability of audit in
occupation  is updated according to the rule
pj;t+1 = ~p

j;t + (1  ) ~pi;t;  = f1; 2g :
7We considered the bomb-crater e¤ect in earlier versions of the paper (see Hashimzade et al., 2014). The
main results on the e¤ects of predictive analytics are qualitatively similar to those we present here under the
target e¤ect.
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It is reasonable to assume that the probabilities of information exchange depend on whether
or not the taxpayers belong to the same occupation. In the numerical simulations we consider
two cases, labelled the focussed information transmission and the di¤used information
transmission, described in detail in Section 4.
The importance assigned to the social custom is also determined by interaction in the
social network. The weight, j;t, is updated in period t if information exchange occurs
between j and some other taxpayer in that period. Assume individual j meets individual i
in occupation  at time t and information exchange takes place. The updating process is
described by a function, j;t+1 = g

j;t;1[ ~Ei;t=0]

, such that (i) j;t+1  j;t if information is
exchanged with a compliant taxpayer, i.e., if 1[ ~Ei;t=0] = 1; and (ii) j;t+1 < j;t if information
is exchanged with an evader, i.e., if 1[ ~Ei;t=0] = 0. In the simulations we assume a partial
adjustment process, where js individual weight adjusts by fraction ' 2 (0; 1) to its lower
bound (zero) if i was an evader and to its upper bound (one) if i was compliant:
j;t+1 = (1  ')j;t + '1[ ~Ei;t=0]
=

(1  ')j;t if ~Ei;t > 0;
j;t + '
 
1  j;t

if ~Ei;t = 0:
We assume that earnings in occupation ,  2 f0; 1; 2g, are drawn from the lognormal
distribution, logN (; 2), and that skills in self-employment are given by 11 & , where &
is drawn from the standard uniform distribution and  2 (0; 1) is a constant parameter.
Each individual knows their own wage in employment, y0j;t = wj, their own skill, s
1;2
j ; in
the self-employment occupations  = 1; 2, and the distribution of earnings, F (), in the
self-employed occupations. At time t = 0 each individual is randomly assigned a vector of
subjective beliefs,

p1j;0; p
2
j;0
	
, and the level of importance of social custom, j;0, indepen-
dently from the standard uniform distribution. The objective probability of a random audit
for all self-employed is 0:05; the employed are not audited.8
A key feature of the simulation model is the choice of occupation by taxpayers. We
calibrate the model so that the allocation of taxpayers across occupations with random
audits matches the allocation in the UK. The UK Living Costs and Food Survey (LCFS) is
used to obtain data on the occupations of all responding households in 2012. Since this is a
subsample of the UK population we use the annual weights provided by the LCFS to correct
for sampling bias. The households reporting as self-employed are then separated into two
occupations using the Alm and Erard (2013) classication of occupations into Non-Risky
(our SE1) and Risky (our SE2) where there is known to be a higher presence of informal
suppliers. This process provides baseline gures of 86 per cent in employment, eight per cent
in SE1, and six per cent in SE2.
8According to the IRS, around 0.96 per cent of individual tax returns led in calendar year 2012 were
examined (IRS, 2014). The audit rate by the size of (adjusted gross) income varied from as low as 0.58 per
cent for incomes between $75,000 and $100,000, to as high as 24.16 per cent for incomes above $10,000,000.
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4 Baseline Simulations
We rst conduct simulations of the network model described above under the assumption
of random audits in order to obtain a baseline outcome. This allows an investigation of the
nature of the equilibrium, a comparison of the model outcome with evidence, and the con-
sequences of the alternative assumptions on information transmission between occupations.
The results we present assume the target e¤ect for audits as specied in equation (3) as it
is supported by recent empirical work (Advani et al., 2015). The results for the bomb-crater
model di¤er only in the pattern of compliance after audit, as described below; the outcomes
for the revenues are not qualitatively di¤erent from those under the target e¤ect. A complete
set of results for the bomb-crater model are available from the authors upon request. The
values of the exogenous parameters and the distribution functions for the random variables
are given in the Appendix.9
Two types of model are simulated that di¤er in the probability of information exchange
between di¤erent groups. Let q be the probability of information exchange between tax-
payers in occupations  and . The rst model (denoted Foc) used focussed information
transmission, q = q = 0 and 0 < q  1 for  6= ; ;  = f0; 1; 2g. That is, at a
meeting information is exchanged with positive probability only between linked agents in the
same occupation. The second model (denoted Di¤) used di¤used information transmission,
0 < q = q  q  1 for  6= ; ;  = f0; 1; 2g. In this case there is a positive probabil-
ity that a meeting between linked taxpayers in di¤erent occupations results in information
exchange and the probability of information exchange at meetings between members of the
same occupation is reduced compared to that under the focussed information transmission.
We perform ten independent simulations of each model over a 50-period horizon. Tables 1
and 2 report summary statistics under both focused and di¤used information transmission.
The results we report for each transmission mechanism are averages for the nal period over
the ten simulations performed. Figure 1 illustrates the results under di¤used information
transmission, calculated for each period as the average over the ten simulations performed.10
The central message from Figure 1 is that sub-groups of the population (the occupa-
tional groupings) can endogenously form di¤erent attitudes to compliance. As expected, the
operation of self-selection sorts those who are most willing to accept risk into the riskiest
occupation (SE2). Self-employment gives them the opportunity to evade, and they make use
of this opportunity to become the least compliant group. The updating process for beliefs
and the transmission of information around the social network result in the subjective proba-
bility of audit being above the true probability for the self-employed. The two self-employed
9The value of the social custom z is measured in units of utility. Therefore, although z appears constrained
to take very small values, these values are commensurate with the values taken by the utility function in (2).
Thus, with given parameterisation, a true report increases the utility of an average individual by about
10 per cent.
10The outcomes for each simulation were reasonably close; thus, across 50 periods the ratios of the standard
deviation to the mean over ten simulations ranged from 0:8% to 5:8% for the risk aversion, 0:1% to 1:5% for
social custom, 0:5% to 15:1% for beliefs, and 0:1% to 4:9% for compliance.
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Employment SE1 SE2
Foc Di¤ Foc Di¤ Foc Di¤
Risk Aversion (j)
2:8540
(0.0140)
2:8304
(0.0207)
1:4070
(0.0629)
1:4205
(0.0544)
0:9762
(0.0549)
0:9904
(0.0176)
Belief (j;t)
0:0002
(0.0001)
0:0007
(0.004)
0:1731
(0.0159)
0:2103
(0.0191)
0:2057
(0.0136)
0:2075
(0.0098)
Compliance
1:0000
(0.0000)
1:0000
(0.0000)
0:7441
(0.0267)
0:7199
(0.0202)
0:6527
(0.0363)
0:6305
(0.0258)
Table 1: The long-run characteristics by occupation under focussed (Foc) and di¤used (Di¤)
information transmission (Di¤). The numbers reported are the values for t=50 averaged
across ve independent simulations, with the sample standard deviations in parentheses.
groups hold similar beliefs, but these are distinctly di¤erent from those of the employed.
The non-zero belief for the employed reects their learning about audits from meeting with
self-employed. The operation of the social custom results in the employed placing a high
weight on following the custom for honesty. Taxpayers in the two self-employment occupa-
tions place much less weight on the social custom but this e¤ect is not signicantly di¤erent
between the two occupations under the di¤used information exchange. In contrast, with
focused information exchange a signicant di¤erence in beliefs and weights placed on the
social custom for honesty can emerge between the two self-employment occupations.
Table 1 reports the long-run values or risk aversion, beliefs and compliance for each occu-
pational group (the sample means and the sample standard deviations for the nal period,
t = 50, from ve independent simulations). The e¤ect of self-selection into occupations is
seen clearly in the mean level of risk aversion in each occupation. Risk aversion is signi-
cantly lower in SE2 than in SE1, and both are lower than in employment. The table also
conrms that the subjective belief is above the true value of 0:05 of the probability of au-
dit for those in self-employment, and that under focused information exchange it can di¤er
between self-employment occupations. Compliance of those in employment is equal to one
by construction, for this is measured as the proportion of agents who report truthfully. For
both forms of information exchange compliance is lower for taxpayers in SE2.
Table 2 gives the population means and standard deviations (according to the assumed
distribution) and the sample means and sample standard deviations for each occupational
group for the wage in employment and skills in self-employment, as well as the sample
means and sample standard deviations for the true earnings and reported earnings. The
sample, again, consisted of the nal periods (t = 50) of ten independent simulations. In
interpreting the table it is important to note that the entries provide information on all
three occupational possibilities a taxpayer could have chosen, not only the one they actually
chose. For example, the table tells us that if, counterfactually, those taxpayers who actually
chose SE2 had instead chosen SE1 their average skill in SE1 would have been 1:277. It
can be seen that, once the individuals self-select into a particular occupation, the average
productivity in each occupation (i.e., the wage for those in employment and skill for those
12
Figure 1: Risk aversion, subjective beliefs, social custom, and compliance of the employed
(Emp), self-employed in occupations 1 (SE1) and 2 (SE2), and all taxpayers (All) under the
di¤used information transmission. The tax authority uses random audits.
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Variable Population Employment SE1 SE2
Foc Di¤ Foc Di¤ Foc Di¤
Wage (wj)
13:045
(2.00)
13:3347
(0.0048)
13:2723
(0.0054)
11:3906
(0.0869)
11:4092
(0.0777)
11:6563
(0.0937)
11:7109
(0.0959)
Skill in SE1 (s1j)
1:387
(0.28)
1:3518
(0.0006)
1:3523
(0.0007)
1:7533
(0.0163)
1:7441
(0.0168)
1:2966
(0.0055)
1:277
(0.004)
Skill in SE2 (s2j)
1:387
(0.28)
1:3631
(0.0004)
1:3677
(0.0005)
1:3222
(0.0032)
1:3385
(0.0038)
1:7282
(0.0238)
1:655
(0.004)
Declared earnings
13:3347
(0.0048)
13:2723
(0.0054)
9:5351
(0.2553)
10:1166
(0.2837)
8:8906
(0.3898)
9:0089
(0.2962)
True earnings
13:3347
(0.0048)
13:2723
(0.0054)
14:0124
(0.2505)
13:9719
(0.2874)
14:1783
(0.4072)
14:4470
(0.3579)
Table 2: Wages and skills in population and across occupations under focused (Foc) and
di¤used (Di¤) information transmission. The second column describes the distributional as-
sumptions. The remaining numbers are the values for t=50 averaged across ten independent
simulations, with the sample standard deviations in parentheses.
in self-employment) is above the corresponding population mean, shown in the rst column.
Hamilton (2000) estimates that, on average, the self-employed report income that is 35
per cent lower than in equivalent employment. In the simulation the reported incomes of the
self-employed are between 25 per cent and 35 per cent lower than the employed, and so t
reasonably well with this observation. The evidence also suggests that reported income of
the self-employed must be inated by between around 29 per cent (Feldman and Slemrod,
2007), and 35 per cent (Pissarides and Weber, 1989) to account for under-reporting. It can
be inated to take account of the personal consumption of business goods by a further 34 per
cent (Bradbury, 1997). The data from the simulation are, again, approximately consistent
with these observations.
5 Random Audits and Predictive Analytics
The role of predictive analytics is to identify the best audit targets, in terms of the expected
level or the expected likelihood of non-compliance. Predictive analytics are used by tax
authorities in many countries, including the IRS and HMRC. The IRS, for instance, uses
information from its random audit programme to design discriminant functions (DIF) that
are used to assign a score called the DIF score to each tax return for the likelihood that
it contains some irregularities or evasion. Various methods are used for identifying targets
for risk-based audits. We wish to explore the e¤ects of predictive analytics on compliance
behavior and to examine the extent to which they can improve on other audit strategies.
The method we employ to conduct the analysis is to embed predictive analytics within
the agent-based model. We then compare the outcome with predictive analytics based on
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tax return data to the outcome with random audits. The two forms of predictive analytics
we investigate involve econometric analysis for predicting the level of non-compliance (level-
targeting) and the probability of non-compliance (rate-targeting) by each taxpayer on the
basis of the information provided on the tax return and by past audits.
This process is implemented in the simulation by using random audits (with each self-
employed individual facing a 0:05 probability of being audited) for the rst 50 periods to
eliminate the e¤ect of the initial conditions and to accumulate audit data. Data from the
rst ten periods are dropped from the statistics we record to remove starting point e¤ects
(but these ten periods are reported in the gures). The outcomes from the nal ve random
audits are collected and at the end of period 50 are used to estimate a regression equation
with the dependent variable being the amount of under-reported income in the rst exercise
and a binary variable taking the value of one if an individual under-reported their income
and zero if reported truthfully in the second exercise.11 The explanatory variables are the
observed characteristics and the audit history of an agent; in our model these are termed
occupation, declaration, and previous audit.12 The estimated equation is used to predict non-
compliance given information collected in period 51. From this point onward, the estimated
regression equation in period t is used to predict non-compliance using tax return and audit
history data in period t + 1; the audit outcomes in period t + 1 are added to the data set,
and the regression analysis is repeated to predict non-compliance in t+ 2, and so on.
The simulations reported here compare a targeted regime in which audits are based
entirely on predictive analytics with the outcome of random auditing. In each period that
predictive analytics are used agents are sorted according to their predicted level of evasion
(largest evaders in the rst exercise) or according to their predicted probability of evasion
(most likely evaders in the second exercise). In the targeted regime the top ve per cent of
taxpayers by predicted non-compliance are audited (this means that the number of targeted
audits is equal to the average number of random audits, so that the audit costs are, on
average, equal between these two strategies). In Hashimzade et al. (2014) we also report
results on mixed regimes in which a combination of predictive analytics and random audits
are used. The mixed regimes are used to explore the possibility that the agents learn about
the audit patterns by exchanging information in their networks: if the audits concentrate on
one occupation, individuals in the other occupation may evade more, having learned that
they are likely to get away with it.
5.1 Targeting largest evaders
Since expected non-compliance is bounded below by zero (we do not allow for mistaken
over-declaration) a Tobit (censored) regression is employed to predict the expected level of
11Alternatively, instead of under-reported income one can use unpaid tax as the variable of interest. In
our model these approaches are equivalent because of the at tax schedule.
12In the regression previous auditis a binary variable, one if the individual was audited in the previous
period and zero otherwise. This specication can be easily extended to include a longer audit history and/or
previous audit outcomes.
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Variable Coe¤. St. E. z stat. ME (avg. data) ME (indiv. avg.)
Const. 15:84 0:21 74:77 13:5338 13:9044
Declared Income  4:89 0:67  7:26  4:1814  4:2959
Previous audit  35:73 144  0:02  30:5271  31:3631
Self-employment 1  1:28 1:49  0:86  1:0949  1:1249
Table 3: Estimated coe¢ cients and marginal e¤ects in the evasion level equation (Tobit
model). The reported coe¢ cients and standard errors are the maximum likelihood estimates
from the data accumulated up to the nal period of one simulation (2077 observations).
evasion. We report the outcomes for the model with di¤used information transmission; the
results for the focused transmission are qualitatively the same. The parameter values are
the same as in the baseline simulations (Section 4) and are listed in the Appendix.
Table 3 shows the marginal e¤ects of explanatory variables upon the predicted level of
under-reported income, calculated as the marginal e¤ect for the average data point (avg.
data) and as the average over individuals (indiv. avg.).The estimated coe¢ cients change
throughout each simulation as new data are added. To capture the long-run outcome we
report the estimates based on the data accumulated up to the nal period. To facilitate
the reporting of standard errors, here we report the estimates from the last independent
simulation performed, rather than an average across all the simulations performed.
One can see that individuals with higher declaration, those audited in the previous period,
and those in SE1 are predicted to evade less tax (although only the declaration appears
statistically signicant). The latter implies that, ceteris paribus, the targeted audits will
tend to focus on individuals in SE2. The lower evasion level of the previously audited
taxpayers reects the assumption of the target e¤ect, as opposed to the bomb-crater e¤ect
(under the bomb-crater model the previous audit has a positive e¤ect on evasion).
The simulation results when the largest evaders are targeted are shown in Figure 2. The
values for each time period correspond to the averages over ten independent simulations.13
The e¤ect upon revenue of the introduction of predictive analytics is the sharp increase
observed at period 50 in the rst panel. This higher level of revenue is sustained for the
remaining periods of the simulation. With random audits the subjective beliefs of the two
self-employment occupations are the same. Once targeted audits are imposed the belief in
SE2 is sustained just above the level under random auditing but falls in SE1. Compliance
increases signicantly in both self-employment occupations immediately after the imposition
of predictive analytics, but then subsequently begins to fall in SE1 as taxpayers in this
occupation learn that they are not the target of audits. This process continues until the
point is reached at which the compliance of the two groups is approximately equal. This is
close to optimal outcome: those in SE2 earn more on average than do those in SE1 so it is
optimal that their compliance level is somewhat higher also.
13Across 90 periods, the ratios of the standard deviations to the means over ten simulations ranged from
0:2% to 0:9% for revenues, 0:1% to 4:9% for compliance, and 0:5% to 66:5% for beliefs.
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The nal panel of the gure shows the empirical cumulative distribution function (cdf)
for revenue under random audits and under targeted audits. It can be seen that the cdf for
targeted audits rst-order stochastically dominates the cdf for random audits. This implies
that expected revenue under targeting is higher. Moreover, for any objective function of the
tax authority that is an increasing function of revenue the expected value of the objective
function will be higher under targeting.
These results show clearly that the use of predictive analytics increases compliance and
results in higher revenue. The increase in compliance raises the chance of a meeting with a
compliant taxpayer and thus leads to a steady increase in the importance of social custom
of honest reporting when predictive analytics are in operation. Compliance is not uniformly
increased across occupational groups when predictive analytics are introduced because of
the reduction in focus on the least compliant occupation, SE2. With targeted audits the
proportion targeted towards taxpayers in SE2 is very high, as one can see in Figure 3; as a
result, compliance among taxpayers in SE1 drops. Despite this, the results still demonstrate
that a policy of targeted audits outperforms random auditing. Our ndings do though point
to the need to support predictive analytics with random audit programme to monitor the
behavior of taxpayers outside the targeted group.14
5.2 Targeting most likely evaders
In the previous sub-section the predictive analytics targeted audits at those individuals with
the highest predicted levels of non-compliance, or undeclared income. An alternative strategy
is to target those predicted most likely to evade, or those with the highest evasion score.
The evasion score is similar to the credit score used by credit-rating agencies, and can be
calculated by estimating a logit or probit regression. For the explanatory variables we use
the same observed characteristics of the agents and their audit histories as in the previous
exercise.
In the data the evasion score is assigned the value of one if the individual evaded tax and
zero if declared truthfully. The predicted values of the evasion score from the regression have
the interpretation of the predicted probabilities that an individual will under-report their
income. In every period the individuals are ranked according to their predicted evasion score,
and those with the highest predicted score are audited. Again, the number of audits is equal
to the average of the number of random audits, in order to equalize the audit costs across
strategies. The targeted audits are then compared with random audits. We present the
results obtained from the logit regression; the results of the probit regression are very similar
and are available upon request. Here, again, we used the model with di¤used information
transmission for the same parameter values as in previous simulations (Sections 4 and 5.1),
listed in the Appendix; the results for the focused transmission are qualitatively the same.
14Hashimzade et al. (2014) demonstrate that targeted audits also outperform mixed audit strategies for
both groups in terms of the tax yield and average compliance but not necessarily in terms of compliance. The
mixedregimes of targeted and random audits are akin to the random enquiry programmes run alongside
targeted audits by the US IRS and the UK HMRC.
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Figure 2: Subjective beliefs and compliance of all taxpayers, taxpayers in employment, in
SE1 and in SE2; tax and ne revenue levels and distribution, under the di¤used information
transmission. The tax authority uses random audits up to period 50 and predictive analytics
to target the largest evaders from period 51 onwards.
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Figure 3: Proportion of SE2 among audited taxpayers in each period under the di¤used
information transmission. The tax authority implements random audits up to period 50 and
predictive analytics to target the largest evaders from period 51 onwards.
The simulation results when the most likely evaders are targeted are shown in Figure
4. As in Figure 2, the values for each time period correspond to the averages over ten
independent simulations.15 By comparing Figure 4 with Figure 2 it may be seen that the
evolution of revenue and beliefs when the most likely evaders are targeted is very similar to
that when the largest evader are targeted. Compliance behavior, however, appears to become
somewhat more sensitive to the around the introduction of predictive analytics, with a bigger
fall in compliance from taxpayers in SE1 and a bigger rise in compliance from taxpayers in
SE2. The empirical cdf for revenue when targeting the largest evaders and when targeting
the most likely evaders are very close, which suggests that these strategies can be equally
successful in recovering unpaid tax.
Table 4 shows the marginal e¤ects of explanatory variables on the predicted probability
of evasion. As in Section 5.1, the estimated coe¢ cients change as new data are added.
We report the estimates based on the data accumulated up to the nal period in the last
independent simulation; this allows capturing the long-run outcome and using meaningful
standard errors. The table shows that individuals with higher declared income, those audited
in the previous period, and those in SE2 are less likely to evade.16 These results are similar
to the predictions of the model for level-targeting; neither the marginal e¤ect of the previous
audit nor the e¤ect of occupation are statistically signicant at conventional levels.
15Across 90 periods, the ratios of the standard deviations to the means over ve simulations ranged from
0:2% to 0:8% for revenues, 0:2% to 22:7% for compliance, and 0:4% to 69:4% for beliefs.
16For the binary variables the adjusted marginal e¤ects are reported. That is, for example, the probability
of an averageSE1 taxpayer evading tax is by 6.3% lower than that of an averageSE2 taxpayer.
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Figure 4: Subjective beliefs and compliance of all taxpayers, taxpayers in employment, in
SE1 and in SE2; tax and ne revenue levels and distribution., under the di¤used information
transmission. The tax authority uses random audits up to period 50 and predictive analytics
to target the most likely evaders from period 51 onwards.
Variable Coe¤. St. E. z stat. ME (avg. data) ME (indiv. avg.)
Const. 5:63 0:38 14:8    
Declared Income  0:75 0:0:7  11:1  0:008  0:001
Previous audit  11:7 263  0:04  0:998  0:922
SE1  2:12 0:63  3:33  0:063  0:031
Table 4: Estimated marginal e¤ects from the evasion score equation (logit model). The
reported coe¢ cients and standard errors are the maximum likelihood estimates from the
data accumulated up to the nal period of one simulation (1943 observations).
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6 Conclusions
The optimal design of audit strategy is important for tax authorities, whose aim is to design
policy instruments to reduce the tax gap (the di¤erence between anticipated and actual
tax revenue). In this paper we analyze two alternative strategies that use the concept of
predictive analytics: targeting the largest evaders and targeting the most likely evaders. We
do this is in a rich network model where taxpayers are heterogeneous in risk, beliefs, and
attitude towards compliance, and where agents self-select into di¤erent occupational groups.
In this model attitudes and beliefs endogenously emerge that di¤er across sub-groups of the
population, compliance behavior is di¤erent across occupational groups, and these e¤ects are
reinforced by the development of group-specic attitudes and beliefs. Given this behavior,
the tax authority may wish to condition its audit strategy not only on reported income, but
also on occupation.
What does our model suggest for the optimal strategy of a tax authority? On the
one hand, given the objective of maximizing revenues, targeting the level, or the value,
of evasion appears to be more important. On the other hand, the strike rate, or the
proportion of audits that reveal evasion, is also important, if the tax authority wants to
reduce the burden on the compliant population (James, 2011). Our results imply that the
two strategies have the same quantitative e¤ect on the revenues; furthermore, the rates of
compliance in population and in each occupation are not noticeably di¤erent between the
two strategies.
The robustness of this conclusion to the selection of model assumptions is, however,
an issue that could be addressed in future research. We have assumed that the agents live
indenitely long throughout the model. It would be possible to incorporate nite lives within
the simulation with some agents leaving the economy each period and new agents joining.
What would be harder to incorporate is forward-looking agents because solving the xed-
point problem that would then arise would be exceptionally demanding on computational
resources.17 We have adopted a very simple process of random network formation. Other
network formation processes would be interesting, particularly networks with celebrities
who inuence many other agents. Another audit strategy of interest to investigate is the
light-touch audit strategies, where either random or targeted audit can reveal only a
fraction of concealed income but at a lower cost to the tax authority. The light-touch
audits allow a wider coverage of population, thereby raising subjective beliefs and improving
compliance; however, partial detection increases expected payo¤from evasion and encourages
non-compliance (Rablen, 2014). This trade-o¤, along with the cost considerations, can lead
to the selection of an optimal mix of audits.
17We run the simulation on a computer with Intel multi-core and 64-bits. The computing time for ten
indepedent simulations of the model is approximately 48 hours. Incorporating forward-looking agents would
require a considerable reduction in population size in order to make the analysis computationally feasible.
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Parameter values
Probability of being linked in the network: v = 0:5;
Tax rate:  = 0:25;
Fine rate: f = 1:5;
Weight in information exchange:  = 0:75;
Probability of meeting a network contact:  = 0:25;
Probability of information exchange
Focussed information transmission: q = 0, q = 1 for  6= ; ;  = f0; 1; 2g;
Di¤used information transmission: q = 0:15, q = 0:75 for  6= ; ;  = f0; 1; 2g;
Number of agents: N = 6000.
Time horizon: T = 90.
Probability distributions (N = normal; U = continuous uniform)
Wage in employment: logw  N (0; 20);
E [w] = 13:0425; V ar (w) = 4;
Skill in SE1:
s1j =
1
1 0:5~x , ~x = U [0; 1];
E

s1j

= 1:387; V ar
 
s1j

= 0:078;
Income in SE1:
s1jy
1; log y1  N (1; 21);
E [y1] = 8:01; V ar (y1) = 12:26;
Skill in SE2:
s2j =
1
1 0:5~x , ~x = U [0; 1];
E

s2j

= 1:387; V ar
 
s2j

= 0:078;
Income in SE2:
s2jy
2; log y2  N (2; 22);
E [y2] = 8:3; V ar (y1) = 22:8;
Risk aversion:   U [0:1; 5:1];
Initial belief on audit probability: p0  U [0; 1];
Initial weight on the payo¤ to following the social custom: 0  U [0; 1];
Value of social custom: z  3 10 5  U [0; 1].
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